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The Chicago Fed held a series of conferences in 2003–04 aimed at understanding the
recent poor performance of the manufacturing sector in the Midwest and the nation and








In September 2003, the Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago convened the first in a
series of conferences that asked some dif-
ficult questions about the performance
of the manufacturing sector nationally
and, especially, in the Midwest.1 What
are the long-term underlying trends in
manufacturing and have they fundamen-
tally changed in recent years? What are
the challenges and prospects for Midwest
manufacturing going forward? This
Chicago Fed Letter summarizes the infor-
mation gathered at these conferences
from fall 2003 through spring 2004.2
Until 2000, U.S. manufacturing perfor-
mance had been robust or at least be-
nign since the 1970s—on average, of
course. Similarly for the Midwest, until
the year 2000, manufacturing had not
led the region into recession since the
early 1980s. Although there was much
upheaval and variation across individual
industries and market segments during
the 1990s, overall U.S. real output in
manufacturing rose rapidly for most of
the decade.
For the nation, manufacturing output
began its descent half a year before the
recession of 2001, dropping 7% by the
end of 2001. And by mid-2004, real
manufacturing output remained slight-
ly below its peak of four years earlier.
Employment trends were much worse.
Payroll employment in manufacturing
fell by 8% in 2001 and another 8% by
the end of 2003. By this time, on net,
payroll employment had fallen three
million below its previous peak. In the
Midwest, manufacturing output and
employment fell at about the same pace
as in the nation.
The Midwest economy remains highly
concentrated in manufacturing rela-
tive to the remainder of the U.S. econ-
omy. The region’s overall economy
lagged the nation during the recession
not because its manufacturing sector
performed worse, but because of this
outsize concentration.
Midwest states—Illinois, Indiana,
Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin—are
among the most concentrated in man-
ufacturing. Though manufacturing ac-
tivity has been shifting west and especially
south, Indiana, Wisconsin, and Michigan
still rank among the top five states na-
tionally in manufacturing output. A
ranking of the nation’s top ten would
also include Iowa. Iowa’s relative eco-
nomic concentration in manufacturing
has been growing significantly since the
1970s, while Indiana, Ohio, Michigan,
and Wisconsin have maintained their
status. Illinois’s concentration in man-
ufacturing has been declining, as the
Chicago area has shed production activi-
ty in favor of business, transportation,
and distribution services, though many
of these services are ultimately sold or
otherwise linked to manufacturing firms
in surrounding states.As measured by the share of personal
income derived from the sector, durable
goods manufacturing is over three-
quarters more concentrated in the
Midwest than the nation, especially in
basic industrial equipment and the au-
tomotive industry. The auto industry is
almost eight times more concentrated in
the Midwest than in the rest of the U.S.
On the other end of the spectrum, com-
puter and electronic components are
not well represented. And in terms of
nondurable manufacturing, the Midwest
is 25% more concentrated than the
nation—heavily represented in food pro-
cessing, furniture, chemicals and paper,
while textiles and apparel factor much less
into the region’s industrial composition.
Manufacturing’s steep and prolonged
descent has meant that the resulting
impact on the Midwest economy has
been acute. That is because the Midwest
economy has sustained its historic con-
centration in manufacturing, so that the
proportionate downturn in the sector
(versus services) became a disproportion-
ate downturn for the region’s economy.
Led by manufacturing, total payroll job
losses across all sectors in the Midwest fell
by 3.6% from late in 2000 to mid-2004,
compared with .9% for the U.S. overall.
Structural vs. transitory factors
The recent manufacturing experience
does not necessarily reflect a structural
decline in manufacturing. Transitory fac-
tors, such as slow world economic growth
and domestic overstocks in capital goods
and production capacity from the 1990s
weighed heavily on U.S. manufacturing
during the early years of this century.
However, the depth and length of the
manufacturing downturn took many by
surprise and tended to bolster the view
that a structural break had taken place—
that break being the accelerated erosion
of manufacturing activity in the U.S. econ-
omy. In particular, the manufacturing
sector lost three million jobs from the
previous peak through the first quarter of
2004. More surprisingly, the sector expe-
rienced greater net job losses after the re-
cession of 2001 than during the recession.
Erica Groshen and Simon Potter of
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
found that those industries that suffered
steep rates of decline during the recent
recession tended to continue to decline
during the recovery period.3 Further,
this pattern contrasts markedly with ear-
lier recession/recovery episodes, when
those industries that experienced cyclical
job losses during the formal recession
tended to reverse those losses during
the recovery.
Is this evidence of a structural break with
the past? A look at the historical perfor-
mance of U.S. manufacturing suggests
that persistent net job losses that outlast
the formal period of national recession
are not that unusual. A more compre-
hensive way of looking at the data is to
examine trends in employment shares
rather than levels. This approach reveals
a very longstanding trend in the U.S.
for the manufacturing sector’s share of
total payroll jobs to fall by 2% per year.
During a general economic downturn,
this loss temporarily tends to accelerate.
Sometimes, though not always, manufac-
turing regains share during the economic
recovery stage of the business cycle, be-
fore settling back to its long-term average
annual decline of 2%.
Rather than using the officially declared
recessions, Chicago Fed economist Ellen
Rissman (re)based the observed national
business cycle to an employment-based
cycle.4 In examining the behavior of
manufacturing’s employment share in
recent years, she found little if anything
unusual in the sector’s behavior relative
to the remainder of the labor market.
Evidence from the nonmanufacturing
labor market shows strong parallels to
manufacturing, which argues against the
manufacturing-specific structural break
interpretation of recent events. Across
the economy, payroll job growth has been
weak in relation to output growth.
Investment weakness
If declining manufacturing employment
is not unusual in relation to the business
cycle, why then has the cycle itself been
so painful? A major reason is that the
2001 recession and its aftermath were
marked by weak or declining investment
spending by businesses located in the
United States to a greater extent than
in most recessions. One contributing
factor to weak investment was an over-
accumulation in the nation’s capital
stock in the period leading up to the
recession. For most of the 1990s, real
investment in equipment and software
grew 10% to 15% annually, a rate un-
paralleled over the previous four decades.
This expansion contributed 1.0–1.5
percentage points to overall economic
growth—at times accounting for more
than one-half of the nation’s overall
average GDP growth. The ultimate de-
celeration of this spending was precip-
itous, beginning in mid-2000, and
contributed significantly to the 2001
recession and its aftermath.
Following the initial adjustment to
over-investment, investment spending
remained extraordinarily weak, only
beginning to regain forward momen-
tum in 2003. Although the overall econ-
omy began to grow at the end of 2001,
events such as September 11, corporate
governance irregularities, and the im-
minent conflict in Iraq all acted to damp-
en investor sentiment and to create a
climate of investor uncertainty. As these
influences subside, the pace of investment
is reviving. Falling relative prices for
computing equipment, technological
advances, and obsolescence of existing
equipment have motivated investment
in information-processing goods. In
addition, revival of consumer spending
on services is encouraging investment
by these industries. Consequently, man-
ufacturing output has been growing
rapidly over the past year, which should
ultimately contribute to revived invest-
ment in basic business equipment and
structures.
Global trade
Recent developments in the global econ-
omy have also led many to argue that
structural change is taking place, as U.S.
manufacturing production continues
to move overseas. Such conclusions are
often based on the U.S. balance of trade
account, which measures exports and
imports of goods and services.5 Coinci-
dent with recent weakness in manufac-
turing employment and output, the U.S.
has been running record or near-record
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rest of the world. In particular, trade defi-
cits with China now account for approxi-
mately one-quarter of the overall U.S.
trade deficit with the world. Other Asian
nations—particularly Japan—have inter-
vened in international currency markets
in support of the U.S. dollar, presumably
as protection for home production and
exports during their own unsteady eco-
nomic recoveries. Such actions have
added to the impression that an artifi-
cially supported dollar has spurred im-
ports to and impeded exports from the
U.S. In particular, China’s policy of a non-
convertible currency and fixed exchange
rate has been identified as a factor in
sagging U.S. manufacturing activity.
At the same time, some observers believe
that a weakening of trade barriers in
traded goods sectors such as manufac-
turing has contributed to “job flight”
from the U.S. Much of the expansion
of the U.S. deficit with China has devel-
oped in the years following China’s entry
to the World Trade Organization (and
its most-favored-nation status) in 2001.
Still, such shifts and swings in the inter-
national accounts do not necessarily
indicate a fundamental structural break
with the past. Currency swings and differ-
ences in economic cycles across countries
(which in turn drive own-nation imports)
often turn out to be temporary. For ex-
ample, the slowing of U.S. exports co-
incided with a slowing of world economic
growth during the late 1990s following
the Asian and Russian currency crises.
The pace of global economic expansion
decelerated from 4.2% in 1997 to 2.5%
in 1998, while recovering to only 3.0%
in 1999.6 In response, U.S. exports abroad
flattened out in the latter 1990s, even
while surging U.S. economic growth
continued to expand U.S. imports.
Such volatile rates of economic growth
in different geographical areas usually
dominate other factors affecting swings
in national exports and imports, such
as swings in exchange rates and changes
in trade agreements. The confluence of
such forces makes it uncertain just how
much of the decline in Midwest and U.S.
manufacturing and the recent recovery
are actually due to changes in the ex-
change rate of the dollar. The U.S.
continued to be the world’s engine of
growth over much of the early century,
and this has surely contributed to its ris-
ing imports. And as the rest of the world
economy has begun to revive, so have
U.S. exports.
Structural change
Since 1950, nonfarm output per hour
of work has been rising by about 2%
per year, while manufacturing output
alone has been rising even faster—at a
rate of 2.8%.7 Using statistical methods
that take into account improvements in
product quality and changing product
features, the output of manufacturing
companies is reported to continue to
run far ahead of prices. That is to say,
prices per standardized unit of output
have generally been falling across most
manufactured goods. Because household
consumption and sales have neither
responded sharply to falling prices nor
to rising incomes in the U.S., we have
observed a falling share of manufactur-
ing activity in the U.S. economy. As a
partial offset, growing industry sectors
such as consumer services and business
services have been purchasing more
manufactured goods. Nonetheless, the
share of nominal GDP derived from the
manufacturing sector fell from a high
of 32% in the early 1940s to approxi-
mately 13% in 2003. All the while, due
to rising productivity, year-to-year real
output growth in manufacturing has met
or exceeded that of the rest of the econ-
omy. This apparent paradox arises be-
cause we are producing more goods with
less effort, freeing more of the work
force to engage in service production.
Such gains in productivity and falling
prices of manufactured goods translate
into rising standards of living for U.S.
households. Since 1940, real U.S. house-
hold incomes have risen 88%, on aver-
age. Even the average real hourly wage
in goods-producing industries has ris-
en 23% (on average) since 1964.
Still, shrinking of the nominal manufac-
turing sector has brought about differ-
ences across income groups, skill levels,
and geographic regions. Regionally, as
nominal income derived from paychecks
in manufacturing companies shrink, the
source of income for manufacturing
intensive regions such as the Midwest
has come under more serious pressure.
In addition, the secular fall in manufac-
turing as a share of economic activity
has contributed to lagging population
growth in the Northeast and Midwest.
The desirability of such regions for ser-
vice jobs has not been as compelling as
for manufacturing.
Aside from macroeconomic restruc-
turing, structural changes (and struc-
tural breaks) can take place through
geographic shifts, movement, or migra-
tion in the location of industrial activity.
Over the past three decades, for exam-
ple, manufacturing shifts out of the
Midwest have occurred as cost conditions
have changed and markets have moved
elsewhere. In some instances, entirely
new industries, such as aerospace and
micro-electronics, have emerged in re-
gions largely outside of the Midwest.
Auto industry shifts
Currently, a shift of the domestic auto-
motive industry away from the upper
Midwest toward the mid-South poses the
most likely structural threat to the region’s
economy. The automotive industry—
both automotive parts production and
assembly operations—is geographically1 We define Midwest here as the states of
Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and
Wisconsin. As appropriate in this article,
we also refer to the Seventh Federal Reserve
District, comprising Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Michigan, and Wisconsin.
2 See William A. Testa, Thomas Klier, and
Richard H. Mattoon, 2005, “Challenges
and prospects for Midwest manufactur-
ing: Report on 2003/2004 Chicago Fed
Manufacturing Project,” Chicago Fed Letter,
concentrated in the Midwest and its per-
formance and location remain critical
to the continued stability of the man-
ufacturing sector here.
More specifically, the domestic assembly
plants continue to be heavily concen-
trated in the traditional auto production
states in the Midwest, while the assem-
bly plants of foreign producers have
concentrated in the southern end of
the auto corridor, representing about
20% of all light vehicle assembly plants,
half of which are foreign producers.
Automotive supplier plants are also
gravitating southward toward the as-
sembly plants, because they generally
want to be within one day’s drive (about
400 miles) of their customers. By one
account, southern states now host 35%
of major auto parts plants.8
Has the geographic shift southward ac-
celerated in recent years? Market share
of the Big Three U.S. automakers has
been declining since the mid-1990s.
Until recently, strong auto sales may
have masked the importance of the shift
southward in production. But now, with
the U.S. economic expansion shifting
somewhat from consumer expenditure
toward general investment spending,
the geographic shift is becoming more
apparent. Owing to its sharp concen-
tration in automotive, for example,
Michigan’s unemployment stood stub-
bornly one full percentage point above
the nation’s in 2004. Moreover, high
inventories and low sales were inducing
production pullbacks by major domestic
automakers during the final two quarters
of the year. If the Big Three’s market
share continues to decline and sales con-
tinue to stagnate, losses in assembly and
supplier jobs will likely be disproportion-
ately concentrated in the Midwest.9
Conclusion
This report contributes to our under-
standing of Midwest manufacturing just
as the region is emerging from its most
difficult economic period since the early
1980s. While much of the analysis here
is preliminary, this research offers useful
guideposts to the region’s policymakers
as they plan for a future in which manu-
facturing will remain a vibrant part of
the Midwest economy, but also a future
in which transition to new occupations
and industries will remain challenging.
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